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 Abstract 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? – Who will guard us from our guardians? – ex-
presses one of the central dilemmas of decision-making: the tendency of the 
organs of the state, as much as individuals, to pursue agendas outside their 
competence; in an opportune environment the executive may subvert the 
checks and balances designed to control its activities. This paper argues that a 
similar process is observable in the EU – where governance, despite the assur-
ances provided by deliberative supranationalism, is becoming ever more in-
formal, ad hoc and disorganised – and is exemplified in the Commission’s 
strategy to improve the coherence of EC law where, notwithstanding the osten-
sible rejection of a European civil code, a broad exercise in codification is be-
ing incrementally promoted. In its Progress Report on European Contract Law 
of 23 September 2005, the Commission marked a new stage in the elaboration 
of a ‘Common Frame of Reference’ and an ‘Optional Instrument’; instruments 
to be seen as the elements of an embryonic European Civil Code. Purportedly, 
the Commission aims to selectively consolidate rather than comprehensively 
codify provisions of EC law as they shape national contract and private law; 
with the task of elaborating ‘non-Code’ measures allotted, paradoxically, to a 
consortium led by the Study Group on a European Civil Code. The Commis-
sion affirms in the 2005 Progress Report the need for a more horizontal ap-
proach to EC legislation, specifically in the field of consumer protection. 
Caught at an intersection of paradoxical goals, agendas and outcomes, it is ar-
gued that the codification approach will ultimately fail. The paper concludes 
by charting the contours of the codification landscape; outlining the major re-
search themes, specifically addressing the governance implications and the 
need for more work to be done analysing the practical effects of codification 
on the law in action. 
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I. Introduction 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? – Who will guard us from our guardians? – ex-
presses one of the central dilemmas of all forms of decision-making in modern 
states: the tendency of the organs of the state to pursue agendas outside their 
competence; the tendency for the executive, in an opportune environment, to 
subvert the checks and balances designed to control its activities. This paper 
argues that such a process is observable in the Commission’s attempt to im-
prove the coherence of EC law where, notwithstanding the purported rejection 
of a European civil code, a broad exercise in codification based on the Com-
mission’s faith – and despite the constitutional objections – in unitary law, is 
being incrementally promoted as a means of stemming legal fragmentation.1 
The analytical parameters for this paper are supplied by the Europeanisation 
of private law; by the increasing intervention of EC law in national private law 
regimes. This phenomenon has come to be seen as announcing the emergence 
of a new species of law: EC Private Law (Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht).2 This 
‘new’ body of law has, unsurprisingly, proven highly unstable; diverse, sector-
specific (vertical) EC legislation combining with divergent national transposi-
tions to produce a range of interpretational problems for the courts to resolve. 
Yet precisely these uncertainties have fuelled a debate, dominated by German 
contributions,3 on the need to consolidate or codify EC Private or Contract 
                                                 
1  Constitutional objections: Colombi Ciacchi, Der Aktionsplan der Kommission für ein 
kohärenteres Vertragsrecht: Wo bleibt die Rückbindung an die Europäische Verfas-
sung?, Jb.J.ZivRWiss (Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler) 2004, Stuttgart, 
Boorberg, 2005, pp. 151-172, Constitutional objections inter alia also cited in 
Weatherill, Why Object to the Harmonisation of Private Law by the EC? [2004] 
E.R.P.L. 633, especially at pp. 640-647. Critical of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of pri-
vate law: Schepel, The Enforcement of EC law in Contractual relations. Case Studies 
in How not to ‘Constitutionalize’ Private law, [2004] 5 E.R.P.L. 661. 
2  Heiderhoff, Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, Munich, Sellier, 2005. Phenomenon reflected 
in the founding of new law journals: the E.R.P.L. (European Review of Private law) 
founded in 1992 <http://www.kluweronline.com>; the ERCL (European Review of 
Contract Law) established in 2005 <http://www.degruyter.de>; the ZeuP (Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privatrecht) founded in 1997 <http://www.rsw.beck.de>; the GPR 
(Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht) launched in 2003: 
<http://www.gemeinschaftsprivatrecht.de>. See also ‘Common Core of European Pri-
vate law’ Series, Eds. Bussani, Mattei, Sacco, Schlesinger, Cambridge University 
Press,  <http://www.cambridge.org>. Similarly Ius Commune Casebooks, Hart Pub-
lishing: <http://www.hartpub.co.uk>. 
3  Exemplary in a broad debate: Beittyke, Probleme der Privatrechtsangleichung in der 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, [1964] Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 80; 
Hauschka, Grundprobleme der Privatrechtsfortbildung durch die Europäische Wirt-
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law; to the distilling of a single, coherent ius commune.4  
Yet whilst no one would question the need to improve legislation, or the 
need for greater transparency in transposition, the elaboration of a Code of 
Contract, let alone a European Civil Code, would be more controversial; im-
posing a uniform law on Europe is a task outside even the most functional 
reading of the remit provided by the Treaty to complete the internal market. 
Nevertheless, in both its 2004 Communication on European Contract law 
(2004 Communication)5 and 2005 Progress Report on European Contract law 
(2005 Progress Report)6, the Commission, whilst denying any intent to intro-
duce a Civil Code, sought to galvanise support for a written, though ‘flexible 
and efficient’ EC Contract law.7 Emblematic of this paradox is that the ‘non-
Code’ measures are to be developed by a consortium led by the Study Group 
                                                                                                                                                      
schaftsgemeinschaft, [1990] JZ (Juristen Zeitung) 290; Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter 
dem Einfluss europäischer Rechtsangleichung, [1992] ACP (Archiv für die civilisti-
sche Praxis) 71; Ulmer, Vom deutschen zum europäischen Privatrecht? [1992] JZ 1; 
Rittner, Das Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht und die europäische Integration, [1995] JZ 849; 
Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1996; Remien, Ansätze 
für ein Europäisches Vertragsrecht, [1998] ZVR (Zeitschrift für die vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft) 105; Joerges & Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags- und 
Haftungsrechts, in: Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993 (Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europä-
ische Integration, Bd. 33), 233-286, 2nd ed. 1999, 301-360. 
4  von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private law [2002] 8 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 379; see also: Lando, Does the European Union need a Civil Code 
[2003] RIW (Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft) 1. 
5  Commission Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of  the Ac-
quis: the way forward, 11 October 2004 (COM(2004) 651 final) Comprehensive do-
cumentation: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers>. 2004 Commission Communi-
cation available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_ 
bus_pract/cont_law/communication2004_en.htm>. 
6  Commission’s First Annual Progress Report on European Contract law. 23 Septem-
ber 2005 available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_ 
bus_pract/cont_law/progress05_en.pdf>.  
7  Ibid. The Commission is at once against a Code, for reflection on non-sector-specific 
measures, and in favour of flexible and efficient solutions(!): Point 2.3 at p. 8. Para. 1: 
‘The Action Plan concluded ... that at this stage there were no indications that the sec-
toral approach followed thus far leads to problems or that it should be abandoned. It 
was nevertheless considered appropriate to examine whether non-sector-specific 
measures such as an optional instrument may be required ...’ Para. 3: ‚ ... Although it 
is premature to speculate about the possible outcome of the reflection, it is important 
to explain that it is neither the Commission’s intention to propose a „European Civil 
Code“ ... nor should the reflections be seen as in any way calling into question the cur-
rent approaches to promoting free circulation on the basis of flexible and efficient so-
lutions.’  
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on a European Civil Code (Study Group). Notwithstanding that negotiations 
between Study Group and Commission, initiated nine months prior to publica-
tion of the 2004 Communication, had not been concluded, the European Coun-
cil pre-emptively rubber-stamped the central measure, the Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR), at the Brussels’ Summit in November 2004.8 Consultations 
on the CFR have begun: Member State experts met on 3 December 2004 and 
31 May 2005,9 whilst a reflection group of 160 stakeholders (CFR-Net) met on 
15 December 2004.  
This paper evaluates developments in the light of the 2005 Progress Report, 
as subsequently approved by the Council.10 The paper begins by placing the ini-
tiative in context; as characterised by polycentricity in the application of ‘Euro-
peanised’ private law. Parameters for this ‘Europeanisation’ process are sug-
gested; elaborated with reference to the character of EC law, the international 
dimension to contracting and the goal of consumer protection. In the course of 
this analysis the initiatives aimed at improving the coherence of EC law, and, 
ultimately, at codification are described. The analysis illuminates a context set 
by the advent of the Europeanisation of private law, and propels us into a dis-
cussion of the sometimes paradoxical impact of measures of codification, and 
the likely impact of the Commission’s initiative on national legal orders. Atten-
tion then turns to policy elaboration and a general evaluation of the likely out-
come. The paper goes on to chart the codification landscape, focussing on some 
of the fundamental themes and problems – relating to the provenance, politics, 
legal basis and justification for legislative measures and the legitimacy, suprem-
acy, competence, institutional and consumer protection implications of codifica-
tion – to which attention has been drawn in codification discourse and which 
need to be developed in future research. In this regard attention is drawn to the 
issue of governance; in particular, given the Commission’s double role in both 
promoting and, ostensibly, rejecting codification, the paper asks who is to guard 
us from the Commission’s initiative if not the Commission itself, and, simulta-
neously, predicts the ultimate failure of a unitary, codification-based approach. 
Finally, the paper stresses the need for more analysis on the practical effects of 
                                                 
8  Presidency Conclusions, European Council Summit, 4-5 November 2004, Brussels, II. 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Hague Programme. Annex I, 14292/04 
See point 3.4.4 ‘Ensuring coherence and upgrading the quality of EU legislation’ at 
p. 29; available at:  
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>. 
9 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/ 
experts_membstates3105_en.pdf > 
10  Press Release, 2694th Council Meeting of 28-29 November 2005, available at:  
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/intm/87210.pdf>.  
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codification on the law in action. 
II. Context 
Debate on the need to initiate a Code of Contract or a Civil Code is complex. 
The phenomena shaping discourse tend to recast what begins as a one-
dimensional search for coherence into a progressively more uncertain exercise; 
pointing neither to the inevitability of a Code, nor, necessarily, to the desirabil-
ity of greater resort to horizontal measures. Similarly, the inconsistent use of 
terminology and the unresolved, if at all soluble, boundary between Contract 
and Private law injects further imprecision into the debate. This, in turn, is 
compounded by the Commission’s practice, seen in its ‘rejection’ of the Civil 
Code, of keeping all of its (vertical, yet horizontal, yet flexible and efficient) 
options open; an ‘openness’ reflected in the Commission’s assertion that it is 
not bound to the findings of the reflection process.11 Meanwhile, the terms of 
debate are weighted: whilst proponents of codification appeal to a positive pic-
ture of visionary coherence; proponents of a competition of legal orders are at 
a disadvantage: the case for a number of simultaneously valid and conflicting 
norms being more cumbersome and superficially ‘less European’. Equally, a 
Code’s coherence can be illusive; if the case were so clear the United States 
would have long abandoned competition in substantive private law. Precisely 
because of these difficulties, this paper begins by describing the background 
phenomena. 
A. Europeanisation 
The Europeanisation of private law began in the eighties with the advent of the 
Internal Market and the adoption of the Single European Act.12 Directly, in 
consumer protection and company law, and indirectly, via block exemptions in 
competition,13 and in the EC policy fields,14 national private law was increas-
                                                 
11  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, point 3.2.1, at p. 12. 
12  Single European Act [1987] O.J. L169/1; UK: European Communities (Amendment) 
Act 1986. 
13  Framework regulations on block exemptions in competition law: Regulation 
1400/2002/EC on the application of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to categories of verti-
cal agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector [2002] O.J. L 
203/30; Regulation 2790/1999/EC on the application of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] O.J. L 336/21; Regu-
lation 772/2004/EC on the application of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to categories of 
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ingly shaped by EC law. Yet Europeanisation is not the whole picture; outside 
the area of EC competence, national laws continue to apply, and national de-
marcations (between contract, tort and property) maintain their validities. Eu-
ropeanisation is therefore an aspect of what de Sousa Santos has termed inter-
legality, of an intersection of legal orders.15 
B. Fragmentation 
Even where secondary law was passed, uniform legal solutions were rare; EC 
harmonisation has always been accompanied by legal fragmentation. Thus, 
whilst regulations frequently failed to unify the law due to horse-trading in 
Council, directives established transposition frameworks, which Member 
States could trump through upward derogation.16 Different approaches to 
drafting (EC level) and transposition (national level) generated further incon-
sistencies between EC law and national laws. Fragmentation in its international 
dimension was then exacerbated by the communitarisation of procedural law.17 
At the same time lex mercatoria contracting and arbitration, methods by which 
contracting parties sought to emancipate themselves from national legal orders, 
were gaining currency. These factors mean that polycentricity now dominates 
                                                                                                                                                      
Technology Transfer Agreements [2004] O.J. L 123/11; Regulation 2658/2000/EC on 
the application of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to categories of specialisation agree-
ments [2000] O.J. L 304/3; Regulation 2659/2000/EC on the application of Article 
81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to categories of research and development agreements [2000] O.J. 
L 304/7; Regulation 358/2003/EC on the application of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) EC to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance 
sector [2003] O.J. L 53/8.  
14  EC Policy fields: Public Health: Article 152 (ex 129) EC; Environment: Articles 174-
176 (ex 130r-130t) EC; Employment: Title VIII (ex Title VIa) EC; Industrial Policy: 
Art. 157 (ex 130) EC; Economic and Social Cohesion: Title XVII (ex Title XIV) EC; 
R&D: Title XVIII (ex Title XV) EC. See: Brüggemeier & Joerges, Europäisierung 
des Vertragsrechts und Haftungsrechts, in Müller-Graff (ed.) cited above Fn. 3, at 
pp. 312-3. 
15  De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Post-Modern Conception of 
Law, [1987] J.L.S. 279, at p. 298: ‘We live in a time of porous legality … of multiple 
networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassings. Our legal 
life is constituted by an intersection of different legal orders, that is by interlegality.’ 
16  Via minimum harmonisation in secondary legislation: Art. 137 (ex 118) EC in social 
policy; Art. 176 (ex 130t) EC in environmental protection; Art. 153(5) (ex 129a(3)) 
EC in consumer protection. 
17  As Heß terms it ‘disengaging Member States from Formulating Agencies’ initiatives.’ 
Heß, Die Integrationsfunktion des Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, [2001] IPRax 
(Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) 389, at p. 395. 
  6
in cross-border trade; a plethora of non-national sources – whether EC law, the 
new lex mercatoria, the UN Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles, 2004) or the 1980 EC Rome 
Convention18 – have become important sources of private law. 
C. Codification 
Given this fragmentation it is hardly surprising that calls for codification be-
came popular; the policy consolidation aspect of debate being supplied by a 
variety of initiatives aimed at improving the regulatory environment.19 Yet si-
multaneously, the realisation has also grown that, just as harmonisation 
brought fragmentation, so too could codification; the choice made between lib-
eralisation and regulation ultimately lending the law a patchwork, rather than 
any uniform, quality. Similarly, simply instituting a twenty-seventh framework 
of EC contract for optional use in cross-border trade would, rather than en-
hancing the coherence of the law, further advance fragmentation. Finally – and 
controversially – with intensified regulatory competition, the ad hoc approxi-
mation of legal orders, described by Ogus as spontaneous harmonisation, is 
evermore common, arguably further eroding the case for codification.20 
D. Porous Legality 
This brief survey discloses some of the reciprocal effects (harmonisation and 
fragmentation), some of the complexity brought about by the increase in cross-
border trade (interlegality and polycentricity) and underscores the disadvantage 
at which proponents of greater competition find themselves (coherence vs. 
multiplicity). The phenomena, nevertheless, also alert us to the wider context 
of cross-border contract, and the political controversy surrounding the propos-
                                                 
18  Respectively: <http://www.unilex.info>. and <http://www.rome-convention.org>. 
19  European Governance – A White Paper (COM (2001) 428 final), [2001] O.J. C 287/1. 
SLIM Initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market), (COM(1996) 204 final); 
Review of SLIM (COM(2000) 104 final); Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment (COM(2001) 726 final); see also infra Fn. 72. 
20  Ogus, Competition between National Legal Systems: a Contribution of Economic 
Analysis to Comparative Law, [1999] I.C.L.Q. 405. Begging the question whether an 
Optional Instrument would, ultimately, not preclude Member States from improving 
their own legislation. Generally: Kieninger, Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnungen im 
Europäischen Binnenmarkt, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2002; Reich, Competition of 
Legal Orders – A new Paradigm of EC law? [1992] 29 C.M.L.Rev. 861.  
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als. Rather than being an open-and-shut case, codification and coherence ar-
guments inevitably lead us into porous legality; the moment legal plurality in 
Contract law is admitted, the more what began as a search for commonality is 
transformed into a more open and contested exercise. 
III. Parameters for Europeanisation 
In this section some parameters to codification are charted as they emerge from 
consideration of the European integration process and the broader international 
and consumer law context. Attention turns, first, to our model of EC law, and 
whether this supplies coordinates for a codification exercise. Analysis then 
shifts to the parameters to codification supplied by the practice of international 
contracting and the goal of consumer protection. 
A. Character of EC law 
The opportuneness of codification can be assessed against its compatibility 
with EC law. Here we can juxtapose the Commission’s model of that law, with 
a more plural picture of the Treaty. Here again German inputs have been strik-
ingly influential.21 Initially, German Ordoliberals hoped that EC law would 
simply erode market-partitioning national laws through application of the four 
freedoms, a competition of legal orders and a programme of negative integra-
tion.22 On an ordoliberal reading, the Treaties constituted an Economic Con-
stitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung), so that elaborating policy outside the Eco-
nomic Constitution was illegitimate.23 Given this scepticism to EC law-making 
                                                 
21  Heiderhoff, cited above Fn. 2. Overview of more recent German contributions at 
pp. 247-249. Generally: Franzen, Privatrechtsangleichung durch die Europäische Ge-
meinschaft, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1999; Gebauer, Grundfragen der Europäisierung des 
Privatrechts, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998; Grundmann, Europäi-
sches Schuldvertragsrecht, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1999; Klauer, Die Europäisierung des 
Privatrechts – Der EuGH als Zivilrichter, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998; Lurger, 
Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in der Europäischen Union, 
Vienna, Springer, 2002; Müller-Graff, cited above Fn. 3; Riesenhuber, Europäisches 
Vertragsrecht, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2003; Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Eu-
ropäischen Vertragsrechts, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2003. 
22  Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the EU [1998] 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27, Gerber, 
Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition law and the 
‘New’ Europe [1994] 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 25; Reich, Europe’s Economic Constitution, 
or: A New Look at Keck [1999] O.J.L.S. 337. 
23  Immenga, Wettbewerbspolitik contra Industriepolitik nach Maastricht, [1994] EuZW 
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per se, the ordoliberal conversion to codification is striking:24 faced with 
creeping approximation and the instrumentalisation of legal bases, ordoliberals 
saw that only codification could halt the (undesired) tide of unstable EC law 
permeating (desired) national law, whilst continuing to undermine both archaic 
domestic provisions as well as those misguidedly progressive measures of up-
ward derogation.25 Clearly this position ignores Treaty revisions, Judicial Ac-
tivism and the standard-like application of EC law, whilst implying that all 
measures of upward derogation are illegitimate.26 Yet the Court of Justice, 
rather than applying ordoliberal orthodoxy, has sought to elaborate pragmatic 
solutions: in Gaston Schul developing market conditions as far as possible ap-
proximating to those of a single market.27 Meanwhile, as Keck underscored, 
integration is not simply about eliminating difference; it is about developing an 
essentially contested community of law. The conviction that written law con-
stitutes a golden path to legal unity is discredited by the legal process of Euro-
pean integration itself.28 
Plural concepts of EC law are more helpful in assessing the ambit of codifi-
cation. Here Reich has spoken of EC law as a law of the Citizen-King; a law 
empowering citizens to challenge national laws, whilst not placing them under 
reciprocal allegiance duties.29 This view of the Treaty is substantiated in the 
diagonal justifications operating in the EC/Member State matrix (for example: 
national unfair trading rules vs. EC competition law; national company regis-
tration rules vs. EC establishment rights).30 Perceived this way, EC law has 
                                                                                                                                                      
(Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht) 14. 
24  Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat- und Prozessrechts in der Europäischen Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft [1964] 28 RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und in-
ternationals Privatrecht) 211. Original scepticism towards the EEC’s law-making 
function at p. 215: ‘With every new law ... it becomes more difficult for Judge, Civil 
Servant, Lawyer … businessman to maintain an understanding of the law even in spe-
cific areas …’ (my translation). 
25  Case 15/81, Gaston Schul [1982] E.C.R. 1409 para. 33. Subsequently confirmed: Case 
299/86, Criminal Proceedings against Rainer Drexl, [1988] E.C.R. 1213 para. 24. 
26  Sauter, cited above Fn. 22, at p. 56; Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and Activism: 
A Judicial Policy for the European Court, [1988] 13 E.L.Rev. 28; Cappelletti, Is the 
Court of Justice Running Wild? [1987] 12 E.L.Rev. 3; Tridimas, The Court of Justice 
and Judicial Activism [1996] 21 E.L.Rev. 199; Wils, The Search for a Rule in Article 
30 EEC: Much Ado About Nothing? [1993] 18 E.L.Rev. 475, at p. 491. 
27  Case 15/81, Gaston Schul, cited above Fn. 25, para. 25. 
28  Kötz, Rechtsvergleichung und gemeineuropäisches Privatrecht, in: Müller-Graff (ed.), 
cited above Fn. 3, 149, at p. 150. 
29  Reich, Union Citizenship – Metaphor or Source of Rights [2001] 6 E.L.J. 4, at p. 20. 
30  Exemplified in Case C-41/96, VAG Händlerbeirat v SYD-Consult [1997] E.C.R. I-
3123 Para. 16 (unfair trading vs. EC competition law) and Case C-212/97, Centros v 
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emerged as a diagonal conflicts’ law; charged with ensuring the compatibility 
of national and EC law,31 of managing an essentially contested legal order.32 
In Viscido Advocate-General Jacobs reminds us of the subtlety of the balanc-
ing required by this system; arguing that the aim is to ensure pragmatic demar-
cation.33 This justification-based understanding of EC law is a concept devel-
oped by Joerges;34 who concludes that EC law neither sponsors unlimited 
regulatory competition nor rings the death-knell of state intervention; neither 
competition nor social policy is cast as the lodestar for policy.35 EC law thus 
operates as deliberative conflicts’ law: elaborating reciprocal tolerance levels 
for EC and national law.36 By implication, national private law can neither be 
fully privatised nor nationalised, neither internationalised nor europeanised. 
Instead, the system delivers diagonal solutions in the balances struck between 
market and state, between European and national. The quality of European in-
                                                                                                                                                      
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] E.C.R. I-1459; Case C-208/00, Überseering BV 
v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH  [2002] E.C.R. I-9919 (com-
pany registration vs. EC establishment rights). 
31  Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law, 
[1999] 20 E.C.L.R. 420, at pp. 429-430. 
32  Bankowski & Christodoulides, The European Union as an Essentially Contested Pro-
ject, [1998] 4 E.L.J. 341, at pp. 345-347. 
33  Joined Cases C-52-54/97, Epifania Viscido and others v ENTE Poste Italiane [1998] 
E.C.R. I-2629, Advocate-General Jacobs, Para. 16: ‘It might be asked why … Article 
92(1) (now 86(1)) EC does not cover all labour and other social measures which … 
might … have an equivalent effect to State aid. The answer is … essentially a prag-
matic one: to investigate all such regimes would entail an inquiry on the basis of the 
Treaty alone into the entire social and economic life of a Member State.’ 
34  Joerges, Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts: Überlegungen zu einem 
Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU, in: Joerges & Teubner 
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, 183, at p. 212; English: 
On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe’s Private Law, EUI Working Paper LAW 
2003/3 at <http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-3.pdf>. In particular at p. 21 on the diagonal 
case-law: ‘the emergence of a law of conflict of laws for ‘diagonal’ conflict situa-
tions’. Cases cited relating to Company Law: Case C-212/97, Centros and Case C-
208/00, Überseering, cited above Fn. 30; Distribution Agreements: Case 161/84, Pro-
nuptia de Paris v Schillagis [1986] E.C.R. 353; Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan 
[2001] E.C.R. I-6297; Consumer Protection: Joint Cases C-240-244/98, Grupo Edito-
rial Océano SA [2000] E.C.R. I-4941; Case C-52/00, Commission v France [2002] 
E.C.R. I-3827; Case C-154/00, Commission v Greece [2002] E.C.R. I-3879; Case C-
183/00, Sanchez v Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] E.C.R. I-3901. More recently: Re-
thinking European Law’s Supremacy, EUI WP LAW 2005/12, available at 
<http://www.iue.it/PUB/law05-12.pdf>.  
35  Ibid. Working Paper 2003/3, p. 34. 
36  Ibid., pp. 45-46. See: Maduro, Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the 
European Constitution: Economic Rights and Political Freedom [1997] 3 E.L.J. 55. 
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tegration lies precisely in this competition amongst the claims of simultane-
ously valid legal orders, in the reciprocity of the system, rather than the valid-
ity claims of any overarching unitary law. The consequences of this apprecia-
tion of the character of EC law are significant: the need for codification is re-
duced. 
B. International Contracting 
A second parameter to codification is supplied by international contract. Here, 
three factors influence the debate: first, globalisation has spawned new rela-
tionships between legal norms;37 second, powerful commercial forces support 
the trend towards the ‘privatisation’ of private law;38 third, questions on the 
extent of States’ legitimate interests have become more important.39 A com-
plementarity, drawing attention to a multi-level constellation of laws of justifi-
cation, exists between these processes of Europeanisation and Internationalisa-
tion; a phenomenon which is reflected in the discourse. For example, as with 
Europeanisation, the international debate has increasingly focused on the util-
ity of a Global Commercial Code.40 Similarly, parallel to regional privatisa-
tion debates, a need to privatise conflicts’ law has been advocated.41 Finally, 
                                                 
37  Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems [1997] 
45 Am. J. Comp. L. 149, at p. 159. 
38  Manifested in the new lex mercatoria and arbitration clauses: Dezalay & Garth, Deal-
ing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Trans-
national Legal Order, Chicago, Chicago UP, 1996, at p. 83. Witt/Casper et al. (eds.) 
Privatisierung des Privatrechts – rechtliche Gestaltung ohne staatlichen Zwang, 
Jb.J.ZivRWiss. 2002, Stuttgart, Boorberg, 2003. 
39  Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Po-
litical Economy, [2003] 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 383, 385. The Community is endowed 
with legal personality and may enter into international agreements: respectively Arti-
cles 281 and 310 (ex 210 and 238) EC. See: Case 22/70, Commission v Council 
[1971] E.C.R. 263 paras. 15-19. 
40  Given increased regionalisation, an expansion of uniform law at international level is 
seen by some as logical; here, whilst Basedow sees regionalisation as the harbinger of 
internationalisation, Farnsworth assesses the chances of internationalisation as slim: 
Basedow‚ Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integra-
tion, [2003] Unif.L.R. 31, at p. 36: ‘increased demand for regional harmonisation … 
will generate inter-regional conflicts … which can be accommodated by inter-regional 
harmonisation.’ Farnsworth, Modernization and Harmonization of Contract Law: an 
American Perspective [2003] Unif.L.R. 97, at p. 106: ‘the … contract rules in such a 
code would consist virtually entirely of a collection of default rules that would be 
available to parties to commercial transactions that did not decide to reject or modify 
them.’ 
41  Whincop & Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private International Law: Default 
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as economic actors continue to rely on national legal orders,42 the need to en-
hance the influence of national private and conflicts’ law to close the ‘regula-
tory gap’ in global trade,43 to better promote global welfare (state interests) is 
increasingly seen as desirable.44 
C. Europeanised Consumer Protection 
A third constraint on codification emerges from consumer protection. Here the 
charge is that the institutions have failed to meet the remit (Art. 153 (ex 129a) 
EC) to ensure a high standard of protection, and, moreover, that the introduc-
tion of fully ‘Europeanised’ standards threaten to further weaken consumer 
rights.45 Faced with such criticism, the Commission has traditionally elected to 
strengthen consumer autonomy; expanding rights to withdraw from con-
tracts,46 and/or widening the range of duties to inform.47 Rather than directly 
targeting trade practices, this strategy sought to enhance protection by increas-
ing consumer confidence; an approach which is, however, now undermined in 
the 2004 Communication. Similarly, the Commission appears reliant on meas-
ures of self-regulation,48 and to aim at shifting to the adoption of measures of 
maximum harmonisation so as to avoid the problems created by national 
measures of upward derogation.49 This phenomenon, supported by the Court 
of Justice in Sanchez, effectively reduces consumer protection.50 A Civil Code 
                                                                                                                                                      
Rules and the Proper Law of Contract [1997] 21 Melb. U. L. Rev. 515, at p. 542. e.g. 
Judges to be charged with ensuring efficient solutions via their access to ‘perfect in-
formation’ on questions of choice of law. 
42  Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Pri-
vate International Law in an Era of Globalization, [2002] 40 Colum J. Transnat’l L. 
209, at p. 264. 
43  Muir Watt, cited above Fn. 39, at pp. 400-401. 
44  Dezalay & Garth, cited above Fn. 38, at pp. 313-314. 
45  Wilhelmsson, Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented Europeanisation? 
[2002] 10 E.R.P.L. 77, at p. 84. 
46  Limmer, Europäisches Privatrecht – das Ende des Zeitalters der einheitlichen Zivil-
rechtskodifikation? [1999] MittBayNot (Mitteilungen des Bayerischen Notarvereins) 
325, at p. 331. 
47  For example, the 18 informational parameters in the Annex to Directive 94/47/EG 
Time-sharing [1994] O.J. L 280/83. 
48  Green Paper on Consumer Protection in the EU, (COM(2001) 531 final), at p. 14. 
49  Howells & Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: has it come of age? [2003] 28 E.L.Rev. 
370, 383: ‘the strategy of a maximal framework directive either is not thought 
through, or it is suggested primarily as a device to deregulate national markets.’ 
50  Case C-183/00, Sanchez, cited above Fn. 34. See: Howells, European strict product 
liability law [2001] 5 E.R.P.L. 10.  
  12
would arguably further erode protection; bringing the enrichment between the 
Member States’ legal traditions to a halt.51 Meanwhile, the Court of Justice 
appears to support the Commission’s market-oriented approach with an in-
creasingly restrictive case-law; here what is striking in recent diagonal case-
law is the way in which the Court of Justice has sacrificed consumer interests 
in the name of consolidating the internal market.52 
IV. Policy Development 
Given the stringency which our survey of the Europeanisation of private law 
suggests for the parameters of codification, this section reviews the stages 
through which policy has been elaborated from the 2001 Communication to 
the 2005 Progress Report: 
A. The 2001 Communication 
The 2001 Communication53 disclosed the uncoordinated development, diver-
gent transposition and uneven operation of EC Contract law; initiating debate 
on the need to consolidate the contractually relevant aspects of EC directives 
on the basis of four options: 
• Option I: not to intervene but to rely on a competition of legal orders; 
• Option II: to develop non-binding principles inspired by Lando or 
UNIDROIT;  
• Option III: evaluation, improvement and consolidation of existing instru-
ments; 
• Option IV: to introduce (a) new legal instrument(s) to consolidate the law. 
The 2001 Communication was criticised for anticipating its own results: whilst 
the first option was unlikely to be approved; the third option, given that all law 
                                                 
51  Howells & Wilhelmsson, cited above Fn. 49, at p. 379. 
52  Case C-373/90, Criminal Proceedings against X [1992] E.C.R. I-131 paras. 14 and 
18; Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Stein-
furt [1998] E.C.R. I-4657 paras. 31 and 37; Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder v Lancaster 
Group, [2000] E.C.R. I-117 paras. 27, 30, 32. 
53  Communication on European Contract Law (COM(2001) 398 final), [2001] O.J. C 
255/1. 
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is subject to review, was a non-option. Whilst maintaining the guise of delib-
eration, the pre-sanctioned options were presented alongside those which could 
be expediently withdrawn. 
B. The 2003 Action Plan 
Unsurprisingly, the 2003 Action Plan54 approved the 2001 Communication’s 
Options II-IV and rejected Option I; distilling three areas in which specific ini-
tiatives were called for:  
• Common Frame of Reference (CFR). The CFR was to improve the acquis: 
tackling divergent transpositions; and providing coherence to questions of 
interpretation.55 A need was also identified for an overhaul of fundamental 
concepts (conclusion and validity, non-performance and unjust enrichment, 
representation of foreign companies, formal demands and the exclusion or 
limitation of liability)56 as well as identifying areas which required special 
treatment (financial and insurance services, transfer and reservation of title, 
cabotage transport, factoring, consumer protection and tort law).57 
• Standardisation. Here the intention was to facilitate the exchange of infor-
mation on standard contract terms and conditions, as well as supplying 
guidelines for their use.58  
• Optional Instrument(s). In launching an assessment of the need for (a) new 
optional instrument(s) the Commission tried to supply a measure of hori-
zontal coherence of EC Contract law. Some guidelines for the elaboration 
of these measures were set out.59  
The 2003 Action Plan seemed contradictory: ostensibly retaining the vertical 
approach, whilst stressing the horizontal implications of the analysis at every 
turn (the need for a general overhaul of contract terms, for an examination of 
the interplay of contract and tort), and launching reflection on the opportune-
ness of (the) optional instrument(s). Notable was that a whole range of ques-
                                                 
54  Communication on a More Coherent Contract law – An Action Plan, (COM(2003) 68 
final), [2003] O.J. C 63/1; Staudenmayer, The Commission Action Plan on European 
Contract law [2003] 2 E.R.P.L. 113. 
55  Attention in Action Plan drawn to: Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland 
GmbH & Co. KG [2002] E.C.R. I-2631. 
56  2003 Action Plan, cited above Fn. 54, paras. 33, 34, 35-36, 32.  
57  Ibid., paras. 30-31, 47-48, 41-42, 43, 49-50, and 67. 
58  Ibid., paras. 81-88, at pp. 21-23. 
59  Ibid., paras. 89-97, at pp. 23-24. 
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tions were left unaddressed: the form of the optional instruments (regulation or 
recommendation); the relationship between the measures (CFR and Optional 
Instrument(s)); the extent to which the choice of law would still be available; 
proportionality and legitimacy considerations. Similarly, questions on the 
reach of the new European standard terms and conditions, quite apart from the 
liability and intellectual property issues attaching to their Commission-
facilitated provision, as well as their availability in purely internal (national) 
transactions, were left to be resolved.60 Some of this confusion can be ex-
plained: absent a legal base and given their controversial nature, the proposals 
had to be marketed neutrally and not as the harbinger of a Civil Code. Fur-
thermore, recalling the restrictions the Court of Justice placed in Tobacco Ad-
vertising on the use of Article 95 (ex 100a) EC, the Commission was hardly 
likely to begin the exercise with an examination of the appropriate legal 
base.61 A more Machiavellian reason for the Commission’s strategy might be 
that policy inertia works to its advantage; the longer the consultations, the 
more emphatic the case for reform becomes. 
C. The 2004 Communication 
Following extensive reaction to the Action Plan, a new circumspection entered 
the debate. Notably, Basedow appealed for gradualism: to initially develop the 
CFR as a basis for opt-in, sector-specific instruments, to then convert these 
into opt-out instruments, and, over 20-30 years, to extend them horizontally.62 
The 2004 Communication appears to subscribe to a similar gradualism: setting 
a three year (2005-7) research phase,63 following which, the Commission is to 
draft the CFR (2008-9), allowing for its adoption by 2009.64 The 2004 Com-
                                                 
60  2003 Action Plan, cited above Fn. 54, at pp. 21-23. 
61  Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] 
E.C.R. I-8419; [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1175, para. 84 ‘… If a mere finding of disparities 
between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to result therefrom were suffi-
cient to justify the choice of Art. 100a as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance 
with the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory …’ 
62  Basedow, Ein optimales Europäisches Vertragsgesetz – opt-in, opt-out, wozu über-
haupt? [2004] 12 ZEuP (Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht) 1, at p. 4: ‘To the 
extent that case-law was developed on the basis of this (opt-in) law, willingness to ex-
tend its application would grow … What is crucial is patience and planning extending 
beyond the next twenty or thirty years.’ (my translation). 
63  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, at p. 13. 
64  Schmidt-Kessel, Auf dem Weg zum Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen [2005] 2 GPR 2, 
at p. 7. The Commission has quite clearly underestimated the amount of preparatory 
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munication expands on the understanding of the measures; outlining their func-
tions, supplying guidance on the CFR, as well as details on the PECL–based 
CFR structure.65 Meanwhile Annex II catalogues the parameters of discussion 
of the Optional Instrument. The main points can be summarised: 
• CFR. Over half of the 2004 Communication is dedicated to mapping out 
function, form, content and timeframe for CFR adoption.66 The Commis-
sion underscores that the CFR’s role is to improve the acquis by supplying 
definitions of legal terms, fundamental principles and, above all, model 
contract law rules.67 Here, whilst Study Group practice would have placed 
model rules in an annex to a CFR, the 2004 Communication places them at 
the centre.68 One of the tasks of the CFR is to test the coherence of provi-
sions of EC law, and, where appropriate, to codify the relevant sectoral 
framework. Here the Communication singles out consumer protection as 
worthy of sector-specific codification; producing a catalogue of questions 
by reference to which the coherence of protection is to be evaluated. In its 
survey of the consumer acquis,69 the 2004 Communication highlights the 
need to combat differences deriving from the disparate provisions of secon-
                                                                                                                                                      
work which needs to be undertaken. In this regard it is of concern that the Principles 
of European Contract law, the core of the CFR, have, until now, barely been tested 
against the acquis. (my translation). 
65  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, Annex I, at p. 14-16, lends the CFR the 
structure of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), as developed by the 
Commission on European Contract Law (infra Fn. 89).  
66  Ibid., pp. 2-5 on functions and legal nature; pp. 9-13 preparation and elaboration; 
pp. 14-16 (Annex I) on the structure. 
67  Ibid., section 2.1.1, p. 3; section 3.1.3, at p. 11: ‘principles and definitions … com-
pleted by model rules, forming the bulk of the CFR.’ 
68  Schmidt-Kessel, cited above Fn. 64, at p. 4. Survey of consumer acquis in 2004 Com-
munication, ibid., at p. 3-4. 
69  2004 Communication, cited above, Fn. 5, pp. 3-4. Desirability of Codification given 
the interplay of Consumer Directives. Commission citing interplay of following spe-
cific Directives: Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in respect of contracts 
negotiated away from business premises (doorstep selling) [1985] O.J. L 372/31; Di-
rective 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours [1990] 
O.J. L 158/159; Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers in respect of cer-
tain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable proper-
ties on a timeshare basis (timesharing) [1994] O.J. L 280/83; Directive 97/7/EC on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (distance selling) [1997] O.J. 
L 144/19; Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of 
products offered to consumers (unit pricing) [1998] O.J. L 80/27; Directive 98/27/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests (cross-border injunctions) 
[1998] O.J. L 166/51; and Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of con-
sumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] O.J. L 171/12. 
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dary law, disparities between national rules and EC law and national meas-
ures of upward derogation.70 Revealingly, the Commission suggests that 
simplifying the consumer acquis will not exhaust itself in dealing with in-
consistency and overlap between directives; consideration must also be 
given to the need to fill gaps between directives. Apart from consumer pro-
tection the Commission also identifies insurance contracts, contracts of sale 
and services, clauses relating to the retention and the transfer of title (prop-
erty law) and late payments (commercial transactions) as areas in which 
sector-specific solutions are required.71 Whilst the sectoral aspect of this 
work seems to undermine the coherence of the CFR, the CFR is placed in 
the context of moves towards regulatory simplification.72 As far as the end-
users are concerned, apart from contracting parties, law-makers and judici-
ary, the Commission argues that the CFR will prove useful to arbitrators in 
the search of conflict resolutions and in the Commission’s own contractual 
practice.73 As regards demarcational problems, the Commission stresses the 
need for analysis of the interaction of contract and property law. Yet sur-
prisingly, the Commission concludes that there are no appreciable prob-
lems arising from differences in the interaction between contract and tort 
law in the different Member States.74 As far as the legal nature of the CFR 
is concerned, the Commission foresees that it is, initially, to adopt the form 
of a non-binding instrument.  
                                                 
70  Schmidt-Kessel, cited above Fn. 64, at 3 observes upward derogation as a source of 
impediments in the market: Case C-491/01 Ex parte B.A.T. (Investments) Ltd. and Im-
perial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] E.C.R. I-11453. More recently: Case C-210/03 The Queen, 
on the application of: Swedish Match AB, Swedish Match U.K. Ltd. v Secretary of 
State for Health (Swedish Match) 14 December 2004, n.y.r. available at: 
<http://curia.eu.int>. The cases illuminate a range of issues: on the choice of legal 
base, disparities in national rules, the danger of heterogeneous legal development, 
proportionality of secondary law, health and trade policy, operation of the principles 
of non-discrimination and the right to property, compatibility of national transposi-
tions of Directive 2001/37/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative provisions of the member states concerning the manufacture, presentation 
and sale of tobacco products, with Articles 28 and 29 EC. 
71  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, at p. 9. 
72  Communication on Updating and the Acquis (COM(2003) 71 final); Action Plan 
Simplifying and Improving the regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278 final), Inter-
institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking [2003] O.J. C 321/1.  
73  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, at p. 5 and p. 6. 
74  Ibid., at p. 11, Schmidt-Kessel, cited above Fn. 64 p. 6, von Bar & Drobnig, infra Fn. 
89. 
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• Standardisation. An intention to facilitate debate on standard terms and 
conditions, with the aim of increasing the efficiency of cross-border con-
tracting is confirmed; the Commission being charged with supplying guide-
lines to their relationship with the EC competition rules, and identifying 
impediments to their use.75 
• Optional Instrument. As with standardisation, the Commission sees its 
role as that of facilitating debate and presenting proposals, which may be 
spun-off from the CFR. The Commission acknowledges the optional in-
strument’s horizontal operation, and attaches parameters in Annex II 
(pp. 17-22) for its opportuneness: 
1. General context: the implications of the CFR and standardisation on the 
optional instrument, and an ‘impact assessment’;  
2. Reflection on the binding nature of an instrument: opt-in or opt-out;  
3. Consideration of the legal form of an instrument: regulation or recom-
mendation;  
4. Content: extent to which determined by the CFR, whether the instru-
ment should embrace general contract law as well as specific contracts;  
5. Scope: B2B, B2C, issues of contractual freedom, mandatory provisions 
and interplay with the UN Vienna Convention (CISG);  
6. Finally, reflection on the legal base. 
D. UK Reaction to the 2004 Communication 
Of all reactions to the 2004 Communication, the common law reactions have 
been much the least enthusiastic.76 On 5 April 2005 the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union reported on the 2004 Communication. 
Whilst the main focus of the Select Committee’s attention centred on the CFR, 
it also recognised the importance of the Commission’s goal of promoting EU-
                                                 
75  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, at pp. 6-8. 
76  See Oral and Written Evidence submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Union. House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union – The 
Way Forward?; 12th Report, Session 2004-5, 05.04.2005. Report available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldeucom/95/95.pdf>. 
Oral evidence presented 12 and 19 January 2005 (pp. 45-72), and 2 and 9 February 
2005 (pp. 73-95). Written evidence (pp. 96-108). Reaction of Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) to 2001 Communication:  <http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/ 
cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/2.1.6.pdf>. 
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wide standardisation. Meanwhile, doubts are raised by the Select Committee as 
to the utility and implications of introducing an Optional Instrument. The Re-
port makes clear that, whilst welcoming the CFR in principle, the elaboration 
of the ‘toolbox’ should not work to frustrate the much needed more general re-
form of the acquis. In this respect Commission and Select Committee have 
quite different views on the status of the CFR. The Select Committee expresses 
concern at the resources being spent on the project, in particular on the elabo-
ration of the Optional Instrument, and stresses the need to ensure value for 
money. Finally, the Select Committee underlines that it is imperative to ensure 
that the broadest possible range of interested parties, in particular practitioners, 
are included in the task of formulating the CFR.77 
Lord Falconer, the UK Constitutional Affairs Secretary, in the opening 
speech to the Joint Presidency/Commission-sponsored European Contract Law 
conference in London held on 26 September 2005, adopted an even more ro-
bust position. Recalling the central importance of mutual recognition to the 
European legal tradition and the necessity of enhancing judicial co-operation, 
Lord Falconer – adopting a conflict of laws approach – placed his emphasis on 
the rather limited potential of the CFR to promote mutual understanding within 
the EU. Lord Falconer drew special attention to the advantages of the competi-
tion of legal orders, and the economic importance to the EC of maintaining 
London as a competitive centre for international contracting. More concrete 
steps towards the mandatory harmonisation of national contract law regimes 
were to be rejected; Lord Falconer predicting that the elaboration of a Code of 
Contract, whether voluntary or not, would jeopardise London’s competitive 
advantage in the provision of legal services and would ultimately prove a huge 
waste of resources.78  
E. The 2005 Progress Report 
The 2005 Progress Report confirmed the timetable for the CFR; specifying that 
the research phase be completed by the end of 2007. The Report focuses on the 
CFR and draws attention to the need for privileged working methods (reliance 
on a website for the sole use of CFR-net members, national experts and Euro-
                                                 
77   Ibid., emphasis at pp. 5, 9, 11, 27 and 29. 
78  Speech available at: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2005/lc150905.htm.> Lord 
Falconer warned: “... Make no mistake, any weakening of the suitability and attrac-
tiveness of the common law of England as the most popular law for the conduct of 
commercial business throughout the world would be disastrous and would be seized 
upon by rival jurisdictions such as New York and Geneva. The EU would be poorer as 
a result.“ 
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pean Parliament), reporting requirements and time limits, as well as stipulating 
that the CFR, as foreseen in the 2004 Communication, is to be tested specifi-
cally in the field of consumer protection.79 As far as the question of Acquis 
Review is concerned, the Report focuses on the findings on transposition prac-
tice in the consumer law areas of the Directives on Unit Pricing, Cross-border 
Injunctions, Timesharing and Distance Selling; here a need to coordinate 
measures with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (especially in Unit 
Pricing and Timesharing), to tackle questions of uneven national transpositions 
(Unit Pricing), to deal with novel contracts and aggressive sales methods 
(Timesharing), and to more closely define the scope of individual directives 
are identified. The outcome forecast in the 2005 Progress Report, given the 
evaluation of current practice, is a modification of the vertical approach and 
greater resort to a more horizontal legislative method.80 Importantly, the Re-
port announces that, due to running costs, unresolved liability issues, and the 
(unsurprising) reluctance of economic actors to share ‘best practice’ contract 
solutions for free, the standardisation website will not be established.81 Finally, 
in the context of the optional instrument, the Report points to the area of Fi-
nancial services as an area in which such an instrument could prove oppor-
tune.82  
The 2005 Progress Report’s findings were subsequently approved in the 
Council Meeting of 28-29 November 2005, which recognised the unique oppor-
tunity afforded by the proposed review and welcomed the reassurance that the 
Commission is not to pursue the construction of a European Civil Code. The 
Council went on to emphasise the need to promote cross-border trade and to en-
sure a high degree of consumer protection. To these ends the Commission was 
invited (t)o come forward as soon as possible with a timetable, a detailed de-
scription of the process, and proposals for updating and modernising the Con-
sumer Acquis and also to reprioritise accordingly the work on the Common 
                                                 
79  Cited above Fn. 6. See pp. 2-6 at pts. 2-3. 
80  Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products 
offered to consumers (unit pricing) [1998] O.J. L 80/27; Directive 98/27/EC on in-
junctions for the protection of consumers’ interests (cross-border injunctions) [1998] 
O.J. L 166/51; Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain 
aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties 
on a timeshare basis (timesharing) 1994] O.J. L 280/83; Directive 97/7/EC on the pro-
tection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (distance selling) [1997] O.J. L 
144/19; Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business to consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market (unfair commercial practices) [2005] O.J. L 149/22; 
See 2005 Progress Report ibid., at pp. 7-9 at pts. 3.2.1-3.2.4. 
81  2005 Progress Report, cited above, Fn. 6, pp. 10-11 at pt. 4.1. 
82  Ibid., pp. 11 at pt. 4.2. 
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Frame of Reference.83 
V. Evaluation: when is a non-Code a Code?  
A. Catalysing Fragmentation? 
The 2005 Progress Report and the Council’s reaction can be criticised from a 
number of standpoints. First, it is unclear whether the horizontal implications 
of the CFR and Optional Instrument will not compromise the Commission’s 
‘support’ for the vertical approach and ‘rejection’ of a Civil Code. That the 
‘non-Code’ is to be developed by the Study Group is just one way in which the 
Commission’s commitment to its goals can be questioned. The commitment to 
the vertical approach, based on the Treaty’s enumerated powers,84 is under-
mined at every stage of analysis: vertical spring cleaning in contract law will 
inevitably generate horizontal implications throughout private law generally. 
Similarly, the CFR will, partly, operate horizontally; particularly where ab-
stract terms and fundamental principles are defined across contract types. 
Moreover, the explicit reality of behavioural and horizontal directives has to be 
recognised.85 Finally, spill-over effects are intended; we are told that the CFR 
is to act as the ‘toolbox’ for the Optional Instrument. Further, the resolution of 
demarcational problems (between contract, property and tort) as they arise be-
tween national legal orders is bound to extend the project into general private 
law.86  
Whilst many features of the Commission’s proposals remain unspecified 
(whether opt-in or opt-out in form, whether measures should apply to cross-
border and/or domestic situations) other options (differentiated integration) 
                                                 
83  European Council of 28-29 November 2005, cited above Fn. 10, respectively at 
pp. 28-29.  
84  Enumerated powers: Art. 7(1) (ex 4(1)) EC: ‘Each institution shall act within the lim-
its of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.’ Functional competences: Art. 94 
and 95 (ex 100 and 100a) EC. Art. 308 (ex 235) EC providing: ‘If action by the Com-
munity should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate meas-
ures.’ 
85  For example, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] O.J. 
L 95/29; Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees[1999] O.J. L 171/12. 
86  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, at p. 9. 
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have yet to be debated. Clearly, if harmonisation has produced legal fragmen-
tation, what reason is there to suppose that either mandatory or voluntary har-
monisation, let alone codification will halt this trend? Furthermore, depending 
on the choices made in the elaboration of the measures, a unique pattern will 
be injected into what will remain a patchwork law. Different patchworks and 
patterns, whilst passed in the name of legal unity, produce unique cleavages 
within polycentric private law. Joerges fear that the debate may outstrip the 
learning capacity of those involved can be understood in terms of the unfore-
seen fragmentary effects that codification could produce.87 
By focusing on specific areas and measures, the Commission maintains the 
veneer of the vertical nature of its proposals and obscures the wider picture of 
what the combination of measures will produce. Unsurprisingly, both 2004 
Communication and 2005 Progress Report favour introduction of more hori-
zontal measures pursuant to the review of transposition practice, especially 
where behavioural ‘unfair practices’ Directives operate horizontally.88 Finally, 
and especially when recalling that the inspiration for the whole “greater coher-
ence” exercise was ostensibly to find an answer to the evermore pronounced 
legal fragmentation in private law, the idea that greater coherence can be 
achieved through the vertical approach, seems fundamentally at odds with the 
fragmentation which an additional “twenty-seventh” layer of cross-border, opt-
in private law will produce. Seen this way it could be suggested that the real 
function of CFR and Optional Instrument has nothing to do with maintaining 
the integrity of the vertical approach or formulating a “non-Code”, in fact the 
opposite is sought: CFR and Optional Instrument are to be understood as cata-
lysts, accelerating of legal fragmentation and forcing ever broader codification 
and, ultimately, rendering a full-blown Code inevitable. 
B. Symbiosis: Commission and Study Group 
A recurring theme is the extent to which Commission, Council and Study 
Group have conspired to one element of commonality; a reactionary integra-
tion model focussing solely on the active consumer. In particular the symbiotic 
relationship between Commission and Study Group, in view of their suppos-
edly different understandings of their objectives, is a central paradox.89 In fact, 
                                                 
87  Joerges, Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts: Überlegungen zu einem 
Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU, cited above Fn. 34, at 
p. 212 (English version: On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe’s Private Law, 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2003/3). 
88  For example. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, cited above Fn. 80. 
89  Ius Commune approach: v. Bar & Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort 
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a welter of paradox surrounds the proposals, the Commission – whilst purport-
edly rejecting codification – subscribing to a Germanic concept of a Civil Code 
as a tool for federalist nation-building; an approach recalling a time when the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) expressed a common identity 
and provided the glue for an authoritarian society and in which, incidentally, 
contract was allowed to operate with little reference to social justice.90 
Yet for all the symbiosis, the Commission remains firmly in control of the 
process, this can be seen, for example, in the timeframe set for adoption of the 
CFR. As von Bar observes, the greatest danger facing the project from the 
Study Group’s perspective is the hectic pace injected into the research and 
drafting process.91 Similarly, Schmidt-Kessel has pointed to the inadequacy of 
a CFR based simply upon the unreflected adoption of the PECL and the enor-
mous pressure placed upon research consortium members to attend, let alone 
prepare for the 30 workshops planned for the next three years.92 This impres-
sion is lent further credence by the fact that the Council precipitately rubber-
stamped the adoption of the PECL-based CFR by 2009 at the November 2004, 
Brussels’ Summit.93 The approach can be explained; Commission and Council 
                                                                                                                                                      
and Property Law in Europe, Munich, Sellier, 2004; van Gerven, Lever & Larouche, 
Cases, Materials and Text on National and International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart 2000; 
Schulze, Engel & Jones (eds.), Casebook Europäisches Privatrecht, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 1999;. Working groups: SGECC <http://www.sgecc.net> and: <http://www. 
elsi.uos.de/>. The Commission on European Contract Law: <http://www.jus.uio. 
no/lm/eu.principles.lando.commission/doc.html>. Riedl, The Work of the Lando-
Commission from an Alternative Viewpoint [2000] 8 E.R.P.L. 71. Other approaches: 
The Trento Group on the Common Core of European Contract:   
<www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/home.html>; Society of European Contract Law 
[SECOLA]: <http://www.secola.org>.; European Research Group on Existing EC 
Private Law [Acquis Group]: <http://www.acquis-group.org>.; European Private law 
Forum: <http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/>; Wurm-
nest, Common Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze – An-
sätze internationaler Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in Eu-
ropa, [2003] 11 ZEuP 714. 
90  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, RGBl. 1896, 195. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der 
Neuzeit, Vandehoeck & Ruprecht, 2. Ed. 1967, at p. 479: ‘Whilst a moderate Liberal-
ism predominates, the BGB accomodated conservative and authoritarian elements, in 
only a very few points was any allowance made for the social challenges of the future’ 
(my translation). See also at pp. 483, 489 and 493-4; additionally: Social Justice in 
European Contract law: a Manifesto [2004] 10 E.L.J. 653. 
91  von Bar, Editorial: Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen, (2005) 2 GPR 1: ’… it is not 
simply the Commission’s limited term of office but also hectic preparation which en-
dangers the success of the project.’ (my translation).  
92  Schmidt-Kessel, cited above Fn. 64. 
93  Cited above Fn. 8, Schmidt-Kessel, ibid., at p. 3, speaks of alternative approaches be-
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could fare worse than adopting a PECL-based CFR in 2009 as a first step to-
wards a Civil Code. However, that the extent to which research group, CFR-
Net, national experts will be able to shape the CFR is limited, can also be in-
terpreted as substantiating the Commission’s long-term commitment to codifi-
cation. 
C. Quixotic Search for Coherence 
The coherence of the initiative is compromised by the layers of paradox which 
obscure the proposals: whilst the exercise attempts a technocratic solution, the 
political dimension cannot be suppressed; whilst the Commission is concerned 
to demonstrate circumspection, it also uses inertia to advance its objectives; 
that none of the parameters in Annex II, 2004 Communication limit the elabo-
ration of the Optional Instrument is an aspect of this. Similarly, the initiative 
fails to meet the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality. In fact the 
whole initiative appears more curious from stage to stage: that the Council ap-
proved the CFR (4-5 November 2004) before the national experts (3 December 
2004) and the CFR-Net (15 December 2004) had met; that all these steps pre-
date the formation of the research consortium; that the negotiations for the re-
search consortium predate the 2004 Communication; that, in any case, the 
timeframe dictates adoption of a PECL-based CFR in 2009; that, regardless of 
their findings, the Commission reserves a right amend the researchers’ final 
report where necessary to achieve the Action Plan’s objectives. 94 The predated 
rubber-stamping of proposals, the immaculate conception of the Study Group 
and short-circuiting of debate can hardly qualify the policy-making as a clean 
deliberative process.  
D. Paradox of Codification 
The double paradox of the 2004 Communication is that, even if a CFR and an 
Optional Instrument can be produced, and even if these measures provide an 
impetus towards a Civil Code, this will not obviate the need to juridify the re-
maining patchwork of private law norms. Case-law and compatibility rules – a 
Common law turn – will inevitably assume ever greater importance and eclipse 
the role of ‘coherent’ written law. As Amstutz anticipates, this will lead to ever 
deeper rearrangements in the Continental approach to law.95 Equally, however, 
                                                                                                                                                      
ing steamrollered by the Commission. 
94  2004 Communication, cited above Fn. 5, point 3.2.1, p. 12.  
95  Amstutz, Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im euro-
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as Farnsworth observes, this will also lead to a rearrangement of the English 
Common law approach to EC private and contract law.96 Whilst the Commis-
sion’s ostensible objective (the non-Code), the vehicle chosen to attain that ob-
jective (Study Group), and the ultimate destination (Restatement-style Com-
mon law) are not necessarily entirely incompatible, the nature of the Commis-
sion’s strategy is far from transparent. Yet here one is struck by how legal the-
ory has already prepared frameworks for understanding the kind of norm pro-
duction seen in the diagonalism of EC case-law.97 The parallels seen in the is-
sues at international and EC level similarly disclose an incomplete communi-
cation and indicate the dangers of seeking to seal off particular subsystems 
from their broader legal context. 
VI. Charting the Codification Landscape 
A bouillabaisse of research themes emerge in the discourse of the Codification 
initiative, relating to questions as diverse as whether codification is a “done 
deal”, as to the character of the spreading network of increasingly horizontal 
Europeanised private law; the governance implications of the codification 
process; the capacity of uniform law and maximum harmonisation to deliver 
uniform legal solutions; the legitimacy of codification and the extent to which 
Treaty-based law-making competences are negotiable; the nature of the emer-
gent law and the institutional agenda behind its promotion; the clash of codifi-
cation with the competition of legal orders and the phenomenon of spontane-
ous harmonisation; the future (divergent?) directions of consumer protection 
and contract law. This section highlights a number of the more controversial 
research areas at this intersection of law and policy.  
                                                                                                                                                      
päischen Privatrecht, in: Joerges & Teubner, cited above Fn. 34, 213, at p. 237. ‘Die 
Konsequenzen dieser Umstellung sind zur Zeit kaum absehbar. “Rechtsverfasungs-
recht” als “Autonomie-Autonomie-Kopplung” setzt eben … Autonomie-Zulassung 
voraus. Dementsprechend käme es darauf an, dass sich die nationalen Rechtsmethodi-
ken der evolutorischen Logik der Relationierungs-Strategie öffneten, die hinter der 
Marleasing- Rechtsprechung steht. Das wiederum setzte tiefgreifende Rearrangements 
im kontinentaleuropäischen Methodendenken voraus, das stets noch … das Gesetz 
und den Mittelpunkt seiner Operationen stellt.’ 
96  Farnsworth, Cited above Fn. 40, pp. 99-100: ‘The UCC (Uniform Commercial Code), 
along with our Restatements, has given us a system of common law that seems less 
startlingly different from Continental European legal systems than does English 
Common law.’ 
97  Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, [1992] 13 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1443, 1445-1448. 
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A. Deliberative Supranationalism: Legitimacy, Supremacy, Policy 
Faced with evermore politicised law, the case for deliberative supranantional-
ism as a solution to the legitimacy problems attaching to European integration, 
as a means of securing the ‘unity in diversity’ at which the Treaty aims has 
long been advanced. This approach involves the delegation of problem-solving 
to non-legal operations, and of using the law as ‘an organiser and supervisor of 
processes’.98 What deliberative supranationalism foresees is a conflict of laws 
approach to the vertical and horizontal interface of the different legal systems 
and levels in the polycentric European legal order. Such an approach relies 
upon the parties themselves, rather than the law-making institutions – relies 
upon the case-law rather than the written law – on non-legislative harmonisa-
tion – to search for legal solutions and to mediate interests.99 According to Jo-
erges, Europe should resist the temptation of becoming a unitary state with a 
written constitution and a ‘constitution’ of civil law, and, instead, embrace a 
diverse vision of Europe and a more marginal position for written law. Joerges 
argues that the supremacy of EU law itself should be challenged: 
(s)upremacy is not properly understood if it is ascribed to some transnational 
body of law. European law requires the identification of rules and principles 
to ensure the co-existence of different constituencies’ objectives with the 
common concerns they share.100  
This idea of Europeanisation as a process of discovery, of a process charged 
with the generation and supervision of public power – in the light of the long 
recognised weakness of the democratic deficit and competence creep – needs 
to be developed. Joerges argues that the only way to ensure good governance 
ultimately depends on the transparency and quality of decision-making proc-
esses.101 In the light of this model, the codification initiative is questionable; 
not simply because of its failure to respect European diversity but also because 
of the mistaken role it assigns to legislation and the courts.  
                                                 
98  Joerges, Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy, EUI WP LAW 2005/12, cited above 
Fn. 34. Respectively at pp. 8-9 and 12, citing Article A I-8 on ‘unity in diversity’ of 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] O.J. C 310/1. See generally 
also Joerges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung des Privatrechts: Plä-
doyer für eine neue Rechts-Disziplin, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 1/2006, available at 
<http://www.zerp.uni-bremen.de>.  
99  Colombi Ciacchi, Non-legislative Harmonisation of Private law under the European 
Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships, [2005] E.R.P.L. 285. 
100  Joerges, Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy, cited above Fn. 34, at p. 18. 
101  Joerges, ibid., at p. 15: “European law should leave ‘vertical’ (‘orthodox ’) suprana-
tionalism behind and, instead, found its validity as law on the normative (deliberative) 
quality of the political processes that create it.“ 
  26
B. Deliberate Deliberation: Legitimating Competence Creep? 
A major question associated with the issue of supremacy is the perennial ques-
tion of the extent of the EC’s competence; the Commission consistently by-
passing this question in the course of the codification initiative as if it pos-
sessed a general ‘residual’ law-making capacity. Rather than being treated as 
the analytical departure point, consideration of the legal base is relegated to the 
very last point of Annex II of the 2004 Communication.102 Similarly, assess-
ment of the proportionality of the measures refers us back to the communitari-
sation of procedural law, which was arguably all that the great majority of eco-
nomic actors ever wanted. Here, the challenge of the how level the playing 
field of integration has to be, recasts itself as a question of whether it is enough 
to ensure a basic framework for judicial cross-border cooperation – settling 
procedural questions relating to jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement – 
rather than launching on root-and-branch codification.103 The important caveat 
such cases as Tobacco Advertising reinforce into our understanding of the in-
terplay of national and EC law is that not every domestic provision of law nec-
essarily threatens the integrity of the EC market as a whole.104 
                                                 
102  Presumably by way of what it considers an answer, the Commission observes in the 
2004 Communication: ‘very few contributors expressed their view on that issue’, cited 
above Fn. 5, at p. 21. 
103  Measures europeanising procedural law: Regulation 44/2001/EC on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] 
O.J. L 12/1; Regulation 1206/2001/EC on cooperation between the courts of the 
Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters [2001] O.J. L 
174/1; Regulation 1348/2000/EC on the service in the Member States of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [2000] O.J. L 160/37; Regula-
tion 1346/2000/EC on insolvency proceedings [2000] O.J. L 160/1; Regulation 
805/2004/EC creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims [2004] 
O.J. L 143/15; Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border dis-
putes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes 
[2003] O.J. L 26/41. Finally, proposals have been tabled by the Commission on the in-
troduction of a European Payment Procedure (COM(2004) 173 final). 
104  Cases C-267 and 268/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993] E.C.R. I-6097; [1995] 1 
C.M.L.R. 101, paras 16-17. Confirmed: Joined Cases C-401 and 402/92, Tankstation 
t’ Heukste and J.B.E. Boermans [1994] E.C.R. I-2199 Para. 12. Reich, The November 
Revolution of the Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited, [1994] 31 
C.M.L.Rev. 459; Weatherill, After Keck: Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clari-
fication, [1996] 33 C.M.L.Rev. 885. Similarly, the Court of Justice adopted a prag-
matic approach to the limits of the Community’s legislative competence in Tobacco 
Advertising at Para. 84: Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council, cited 
above, Fn. 61. See also: para. 83 ‘… the powers of the Community are limited to those 
specifically conferred upon it.’ 
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Clearly, both deliberative supranationalism and codification can be seen as 
problematic from the competence perspective: is deliberative supranationalism 
anything more than a convenient description of the modern trend towards 
evermore informal, ad hoc, disorganised decision-making? Could such deliber-
ate deliberation simply be aimed at obscuring the true extent of the democratic 
deficit and the legitimacy problem. Similarly, can we have any faith in the so-
lutions produced by unitary law? And, notwithstanding the caveats to suprana-
tional or deliberate deliberation, is anything to be gained by substituting delib-
eration with unitary law? Ultimately, both the deliberation and unitary law ap-
proaches detract from the integrity of the process of European integration. It is 
in this sense that Ward’s healthy scepticism towards European governance dis-
course can best be understood; to avoid stretching the limits of its credibility 
Europe requires a much more imaginative approach to integration.105 Here it is 
important to recall that the Treaty itself has always been predicated upon pre-
cisely the type of parameters to which Ward alludes, and which the institutions 
would to well to rediscover; constructing an ever closer union has to be bal-
anced with the need to protect national identities.106 In this context of protect-
ing diversity, the traditional resort to measures of minimum harmonisation was 
more than simply a means by which the requirement of unanimity in Council 
was to be avoided; representing a double compromise between achieving mar-
ket integration and realising wider policy objectives on the one hand, and ob-
serving the imperatives of market integration and ensuring respect for national 
identities on the other. 
C. Unitary vs. Essentially Contested Legal Order? 
An associated theme is the extent to which the EC is bound by its powers. 
Here, as Weatherill observes, whilst the institutions have so far been successful 
in marginalizing codification by understating or obscuring the nature and ex-
tent of the proposals, this is unlikely to prove a satisfactory longer term strat-
                                                 
105  Ward, Beyond Constitutionalism. The Search for a European political imagination, 
[2001] 7 E.L.J. 24, at pp. 39-40: ‘Europe’s future does not lie in ideologies or institu-
tions, or in Treaties or charters of various enumerated ‘rights’. And so it does not lie in 
the fundamental human rights of Article 6, or in its illusion of ‘democracy’ or the rule 
of law. Europe’s future lies in the political imagination; in its ability to think rather 
more of the ‘human’ and rather less of the ‘rights’; rather more of liberty and rather 
less of ‘democracy’; rather more of equality and rather less of the ‘rule of law’... To 
echo Jacques Derrida’s deployment of Kafka’s metaphor, humanity must contemplate 
a sense of justice which lies ‘beyond’ rather than ‘before’ the law.’ 
106  As provided by Art. 6 (3) (ex F (3)) EU: ‘The Union shall respect the national identi-
ties of its Member States.’ 
  28
egy; as the EC does not possess a residual law-making competence beyond the 
functional competences aimed at securing Treaty objectives,107 the adoption of 
legislative measures would require a Treaty revision to allow the Commission 
to proceed.108 Yet at the same time, the Treaty operates as a non-exhaustive 
framework treaty; with the institutions charged with making the case for each 
initiative as it is adopted. The acid question is whether the institutions can fi-
nesse their enumerated powers by packaging codification measures in market-
integration language, relying on inertia to propel the proposals through the 
law-making process. Nonetheless, neither the adoption of an explicit, general 
law-making competence nor codification by stealth would be justifiable, being 
incompatible with both the structure of the Treaty and our understanding of 
European integration.  
D. Institutional Dynamics: towards a new Functionalism? 
Another codification theme demanding further elaboration is the extent to 
which institutional roles have been reversed in the course of Europeanisation, 
or whether codification has established a new institutional functionalism . One 
way to look at these dynamics is to contrast the relationship between Commis-
sion and Court over time: the Commission initially adopting a pragmatic and 
the Court of Justice an activist, functional approach to integration.109 It can be 
argued that the prospect of codification has altered these coordinates with the 
Court, in Tobacco Advertising and Swedish Match, exemplifying a new prag-
matism and the Commission adopting an increasingly functional approach. Yet 
a more sceptical analysis is also available; the institutions reinforcing their un-
derstanding of their mission. Commission, Parliament and Court can be seen as 
complicit in the codification initiative in a novel way. Here Commission v 
Council110 is instructive on the relationship between supranational and inter-
governmental decision-making, the Court annulling a framework decision in 
Council111 and sanctioning a broad right of political input from Commission 
                                                 
107  Functional competences, cited above Fn. 84.  
108  Weatherill, cited above Fn. 1, commenting on the implications of Tobacco Advertising 
at p. 646: ‘the demise of the political assumption that the EC possesses a competence 
carte blanche to harmonize laws may clear the way to a more explicit and constructive 
focus on what really is needed of a programme of harmonisation in the modern Euro-
pean Union ... the context has altered. Centralisation is under fire. Harmonisation has 
become a more constitutionally contested process.’ 
109  Rasmussen, cited above Fn. 26. 
110  C-176/03 Commission v Council, judgment of 13. September 2005, n.y.r., available at: 
<http://curia.eu.int>.  
111  Framework decision on combatting environmental crime; Framework Decision 
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and Parliament into the decision-making process on environmental protec-
tion.112 Despite the lack of competence in criminal law and procedure the 
Court held: 
‘…as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure 
fall within the Community’s competence’,… ‘(this)… finding does not pre-
vent the Community legislature, when the application of effective, proportion-
ate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is 
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from tak-
ing measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it 
considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on en-
vironmental protection are fully effective.’113  
This the court did despite the concerted opposition of the Council and 10 
Member States in the proceedings. Following the judgment, the Commission 
issued a Communication to Parliament and Council spelling out the implica-
tions, namely, that whilst measures of criminal law implementing environ-
mental objectives can be adopted on a Community basis only at sectoral level 
and only on condition that there is a clear need to combat serious shortcomings 
in the implementation of the Community’s objectives: 
‘… in addition to environmental protection the Court’s reasoning can… be 
applied to all Community policies and freedoms which involve binding legis-
lation with which criminal penalties should be associated to ensure their effec-
tiveness.’ ‘The Court makes no distinction according to the nature of the 
criminal law measures. Its approach is functional. The basis on which the 
Community legislature may provide for measures of criminal law is the neces-
sity to ensure that Community rules and regulations are complied with.’114 
On this basis the Commission proceeded to launch a review of the consistency 
of resort to measures of criminal law and to itemise the acts adopted – whether 
decisions or directives – and proposals pending to be amended or annulled in 
the light of the judgment.115 In effect the Court restricts the role of intergov-
                                                                                                                                                      
2003/80/JHA, 27 January 2003, [2003] O.J. L 29/55 on the protection of the environ-
ment through criminal law.  
112  Environmental decision pursuant to Art. 175(1) (ex 130s) EC. 
113  Case C-176/03, cited above Fn. 110, paras. 47 and 48 respectively. 
114  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03) 
Commission v Council, Brussels 24.11.2005, COM(2005) 583 final/2, paras. 8 and 9 
at p. 3.  
115  Ibid. The list of acts adopted but now requiring revision: Council framework Decision 
2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions 
against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the EURO [2000] O.J. L 
140/1; Council Framework Decision amending above Decision [2001] O.J. L 329/3 
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ernmentalism; the institutions conveniently agreeing to enhance their powers. 
Here, a central question is whether the institutional dynamics have been ir-
revocably altered, and whether the institutions, given their stewardship of the 
Treaty, have moved themselves outside the scope of control. 
Away from the centre, in the narrower context of the relationship between 
the CFR Research Project and the Commission special attention to the institu-
tional dynamics is also needed. Clearly the Commission has proven the motor 
of this process, consistently developing the case for reform. The role of the re-
search and reflection group led by the Study Group is clearly subordinate to 
the role of the Commission. In fact we can go further, the Commission instru-
mentalises the findings of the Study Group as it finds opportune. 
It is clear from this analysis that major separation of powers’ deficiencies 
arise in the process as it been so far engaged. In fact the debate exemplifies the 
European democratic deficit, in particular in the way in which the institutions 
have conspired in the promotion of codification. Here the institutions would do 
well to elaborate an understanding of their own goals and practices: no inter-
ests are served by encouraging Parliamentarians to encourage the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                      
(both based on Article 123(4) EC; Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA com-
bating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment [2001] O.J. L 149/1 
(adopted under Articles 57(2) and 95 EC); Council Directive 91/398/EEC on preven-
tion of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering [1991] O.J. 
L 166/77, Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the 
proceeds of crime [2001] O.J. L 182/1 (both based on Articles 47(2) and 95 EC); Di-
rective defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence and Coun-
cil framework Decision on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the fa-
cilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence [2002] O.J. L 328/17 (based on 
Articles 61(a) and 63(3)(b) EC); Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on 
combating corruption in the private sector [2003] O.J. L 192/54) (based on Article 95 
EC); Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information sys-
tems [2005] O.J. L 69/67) (based on Article 95 EC); Directive 2005/35/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on ship-source pollution and on the introduc-
tion of penalties for infringements and Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to 
strengthen the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-
source pollution [2005] O.J. L 255/11 (based on Article 80(2) EC). Proposals pending: 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the crimi-
nal-law protection of the Community's financial interests (PIF) [2001] O.J. C 
240E/125 (based on Article 280(4) EC); Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights and for a Council framework decision to strengthen the criminal 
law framework to combat intellectual property offences, COM (2005) 276 final (based 
on Article 95 EC). 
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to encourage a research consortium to engage in a scripted monologue in the 
hope that inertia will move the exercise forward along the mutually reinforcing 
coordinates of reciprocal aggrandisement; European legal and political culture 
is damaged by the instrumentalisation of law and the marginalisation of criti-
cism and subversion of debate. 
E. Spectre of Neo-liberal Consumer Protection 
The relationship between the codification and consumer protection needs to be 
further explored. In particular one may wonder why the proposals are as indis-
pensable as the Commission suggests; if the goals are as technical as main-
tained, why was a more modest regulatory simplification, in line with pre-
existing initiatives, not proposed? Further, the questions raised by the 2004 
Communication are provocative: can a directive do too much to ensure con-
sumer confidence? Striking is the conservative logic; selectively suppressing 
the role of consumer confidence in market integration in order, presumably, to 
confirm a wider agenda. In this respect, the extent to which the proposals mark 
a radical ‘diagonal’ departure in policy making is impressive: whilst the ap-
proach taken is dominated by internal market concerns, it is packaged in terms 
of consumer protection. As with the Commission team overseeing Codifica-
tion, the Study Group is awash with internal market rather than consumer law 
experts. 
Furthermore, as Rott, Howells and Wilhemsson have variously analysed, the 
Commission’s fixation with market liberalism threatens to work to the cost of 
enhancing the level of European consumer protection.116 Here it is important 
to retain that the Treaty prescribes that the Commission pursue a high level of 
consumer protection. As this paper has explored, the extent to which consumer 
protection has been and is being diluted can be seen in a number of respects: 
not only in the shift to promoting measures of full harmonisation, but also in 
the balance of argument throughout the stages of policy elaboration from 2001 
Communication to 2005 Progress Report. Similarly, Wilhelmsson’s sceptical 
position on the feasibility of codification given the diverse levels of social 
                                                 
116  Rott, Consumer Guarantees in the Future Consumer Credit Directive: Mandatory Ban 
on Consumer Protection? [2005] E.R.P.L. 383 in the context of suretyships. Rott, Be-
drohung des Verbraucherschutzes im internationalen Verfahrens- und Privatrecht 
durch den Binnenmarkt, [2005] EuZW 167, in the context of international procedural 
law. Similarly on the constitutional reservations to codification: Colombi Ciacchi, 
cited above Fn. 1, pp. 151-172. On the place of consumer interests see also: Howells 
and Wilhelmsson, cited above Fn. 49. Wilhelmsson, cited above Fn. 45. Wilhelmsson, 
infra Fn. 117. Howells, cited above, Fn. 50. 
  32
model embeddedness in the different Member States, seems to have been dis-
counted by the Commission.117 The dilution of EC consumer protection may 
be connected to the perception that the limits of the traditional consumer in-
formation model have now been reached, and that further information re-
quirements would simply ruin contractual transparency. Even to the extent that 
the case against such constraints is valid, this does not refute the case for a 
more substantial measure of consumer protection: a common market relies 
upon consumer confidence; in fact there is no integrity to any market without a 
high level of consumer protection. 
F. Codification, Spontaneous and Non-legislative Harmonisation 
The disputed and complex relationship between fragmentation, competition of 
legal orders, codification and spontaneous harmonisation should be thoroughly 
illuminated before further steps towards codification are undertaken. In this re-
gard it can be argued that the main danger is that codification would achieve 
the worst of all possible outcomes: frustrating both national and European ini-
tiatives aimed at simplifying, improving and modernising the law, whilst, si-
multaneously, failing to achieve a level of harmonisation which would none-
theless be achieved spontaneously. Yet even the measure and extent of con-
solidation achieved by spontaneous harmonisation – recalling Wilhemsson on 
the cultural specifity of private law systems – can be disputed, spontaneous 
harmonisation is, arguably, only effective in those rare and narrow areas of 
substantial functional similarity across legal systems. More generally, sponta-
neous harmonisation can be seen to lead to the broader diffusion of legal irri-
tants. Yet beyond, and partially obscured by, spontaneous harmonisation, lies 
the more pragmatic concept of non-legislative harmonisation; that case law 
convergence produced by judicial implementation of horizontal European con-
stitutional rights, freedoms and principles could effectively obviate the need 
for broader measures of horizontal legislative harmonisation.118 
                                                 
117  Wilhemsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract law, [2004] 10 E.L.J. 712. 
Wilhelmsson on the elusive value-structure of the Welfare State in Contract law at 
p. 716: ‘The philosophy of the welfare state ... is too vague and contradictory, has dif-
ferent connotations in different countries, and points at measures ... far away from the 
regulation of contracts... It leaves room for many types of welfarist contract laws. It 
accepts a large spectre of varieties of welfarism in contract law.’ 
118  Colombi Ciacchi, cited above Fn. 99. 
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G. Path Dependency of a Civil Code 
The path dependency of the Commission’s unitary vision of private law is an-
other topic describing the codification landscape which needs further analysis. 
The model behind the Commission’s initiative is based on the German model of 
legal and political integration. Unsurprisingly, the Commission officials charged 
with the CFR and both the Study Group and the CFR-Net are dominated by 
German academics and lawyers. To many it may appear the height of irony that 
the German model be taken as the blueprint for constructing an efficient system 
of European private law; though one has to recognise that it is easier to create a 
new body of law than it is to improve an existing text; that it is easier to create 
the twenty-seventh framework than it is to work on a conflicts’ solution to the 
interplay of national (and especially the German), European and international 
legal orders. Again, were such pragmatism to explain the initiative, this would 
not auger well for the chances of successful codification. 
H. Towards a New Emphasis on the Law in Action 
Yet whilst the caveats alluded to in this work are pertinent and would indicate 
the desirability of more stringent parameters for the Commission’s initiative, it 
is also clear that the weight of institutional prestige invested in, and the policy-
making inertia already attaching to the project suggests that the initiative has 
reached a point of no return. A reduction to the ambit of the proposals is no 
longer feasible, such that, rather than being able to limit, slow or influence the 
process in any fundamental way, the task for legal science in the coming years 
will be to critically accompany, reflect and evaluate the process, the specific 
proposals and the concrete steps taken towards constructing the European Civil 
Code. In this regard, the legal coherence of individual CFR proposals, their 
provenance and practical effect on the law in action will require comparative 
analysis on a field-by-field basis. In the light of our conclusions on the Com-
mission’s initiate, a particular focus will need to be maintained on two interre-
lated issues: first, consumer protection, and the extent to which the CFR pro-
posals have the tendency to water down the standard of protection; and, sec-
ond, the Commission’s ‘adherence’ to the vertical approach, and the extent to 
which this acts as a catalyst for the adoption of ever broader horizontal meas-
ures. Meanwhile the cross-jurisdictional equivalence of individual legal in-
struments and the practical application of the law needs to receive renewed and 
rigorous attention to ensure that the codification initiative does not simply pro-
duce an ever greater level of fragmentation. 
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VII. Conclusions 
This analysis has exposed some of the hazards of the Commission’s ‘non-
Code/Code’ approach to Europeanised private law: the fundamental paradox in 
the Commission’s policy development; the convenient truncation of debate ex-
ercised by the institutions; the incomplete treatment of the alternative options 
in policy discourse; the inertia relied upon by the Commission to propel its 
proposals forward; and the potentially fragmentary effect of codification itself. 
The dangers attaching to the proposed measures are largely attributable to the 
Commission’s model of EC law, and its outdated conception of the way legal 
orders interact. This paper has argued, refuting the Commission’s proposition, 
that legal unity in today’s Europe cannot be generated by uniform law. In fact, 
it is argued that we can go further: in a global environment, given the absence 
of both reliable demarcation and a dependable rule hierarchy, we can expect 
diagonal conflicts in the multi-level pattern of international legal relations to 
increase dramatically. Moreover, a whole range of basic principles of Euro-
pean law are offended by the Commission’s ‘non-Code/Code’ approach to the 
phenomenon of Europeanisation: most astoundingly, subsidiarity and propor-
tionality – ostensibly means by which resort to central power is to be limited – 
are simply recast as functional competences. Meanwhile, the special problems 
faced by the new, and especially the smaller Accession States – particularly 
with regard to their capacity of dealing with constant and invasive law reform 
– are simply discarded.119 Furthermore, when seen from the consumer protec-
tion perspective the project is even more worrying. Meanwhile, little attention 
is paid to either the international context or to linking these proposals to pre-
existing initiatives aimed at simplifying and consolidating the European regu-
latory framework. 
The prognosis for the Council/Commission/Study Group’s ‘non-Code/ 
Code’ approach is unfavourable: attempting the coordination of the multi-level 
European legal order, whilst ignoring the interlegality of modern legal norm 
production; clinging to an outdated hierarchical ‘supremacy’ methodology, 
whilst suppressing debate on the project’s basic feasibility; insisting upon a 
professorial ius commune, rather than focusing on the more pragmatic develop-
                                                 
119  Reich, Transformation of Contract law and Civil Justice in the new EU Member 
Countries – The Example of the Baltic States, Hungary and Poland [2005] 23 Penn. 
State Intl. L. Rev. 587, especially at pp. 589-590 and 621-622. At p. 622: ‘… prob-
lems in law application in new member countries not so much in the legislative 
framework but in the missing suitable structure … to ensure the application and en-
forcement of the new legal rules in practice.’ 
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ment of ‘restatement’-style European common law, and promoting a ‘constitu-
tionalised’, federal conception of the EU is unlikely to be successful. The ease 
with which academic capacity has, nevertheless, been directed to achieving the 
Commission’s goal is striking, all the more so given that even the simplest 
questions await resolution: why should the contracting parties select an opt-in 
Optional Instrument? Can freedom of contract be squared with adoption of an 
opt-out Optional Instrument? Can a Code ever be more efficient than sponta-
neous or non-legislative harmonisation? Indeed do any of these options pro-
duce efficiency in any tangible sense, or do they simply exacerbate the prob-
lems caused by the inflation of legal irritants. Finally, how can real consensus 
for a business-friendly ‘Uniform law’ be secured, and which consumers are to 
be exposed to such a law?  
The analysis undertaken in this paper suggests that, ideally, a number of ca-
veats should have been built into the Council/ Commission/ Study Group’s 
codification initiative. First, the relationship between the ius commune and 
programmes aimed at simplifying, improving and consolidating EC law should 
be addressed before any substantive work proceeds. Under no circumstances 
should the mere prospect of codification work to compromise national initia-
tives aimed at simplifying and consolidating the law. Again, it is contended 
that Common law methodology should inform the debate in a much more sig-
nificant way than has been the case until now. Similarly, in view of the poten-
tial for exacerbating legal fragmentation, the project should, at least initially, 
and at its outer limit be limited to the drafting of opt-in Optional Instruments 
for homogenous legal products in cross-border trade. Finally, the position of 
practitioners and the significance of case-law need to be better recognised and 
reflected in any legislative measures adopted on the basis on the CFR. 
Equally, whilst the theoretical considerations alluded to in this work indi-
cate the need for a greater stringency to the initiative, the weight of institu-
tional prestige as well as the policy-making inertia already attaching to the pro-
ject suggests that there is no turning back; the ambit of the proposals cannot be 
reduced in any fundamental way. The task for legal science in the coming 
years will therefore be to critically accompany, reflect and evaluate the proc-
ess, the specific proposals and the steps taken towards the Civil Code. In this 
respect, the legal coherence of the CFR proposals, their provenance and practi-
cal effect will require comparative analysis on a field-by-field basis. As this 
paper has argued, a particular focus will need to be maintained on the issues of 
consumer protection and the Commission’s adherence to the vertical approach. 
Meanwhile the cross-jurisdictional equivalence of specific instruments and the 
practical application of the law in action needs to receive renewed and rigorous 
attention to ensure that codification does not simply produce ever greater legal 
fragmentation. 
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